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Abstract 
Various studies have demonstrated that while the lower educated support economic 
redistribution more than the higher educated do, they nonetheless dislike welfare support for 
immigrants more strongly. This paper aims to explain this remarkably particularistic 
application of the principle of economic egalitarianism (‘welfare chauvinism’) by testing three 
theories by means of survey data representative for the Dutch population (N = 1,972). The 
first theory asserts that the low level of political competence of the lower educated is 
responsible, the second focuses on their weak economic position, and the third claims that 
their limited amount of cultural capital is decisive. Only the latter explanation is confirmed 
and implications for debates about ethnocentrism, deservingness and welfare state legitimacy, 
as well as the ideological profile of the lower-educated working class are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The so-called ‘deservingness’ debate about the welfare state addresses the question whether 
and why the public at large considers particular social groups or categories more or less 
entitled to welfare (Van Oorschot, 2000). Informed by findings on the United States, where 
low levels of support for welfare distribution seem to be mainly informed by racial views 
(Federico, 2005: 684; Gilens, 1995), several studies have demonstrated that in Europe, too, 
immigrants are considered less entitled to welfare than native needy social categories such as 
the elderly, the handicapped, or the unemployed (Applebaum, 2002; Bay and Pedersen, 2006; 
Van Oorschot, 2006; Van Oorschot, 2007; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007). Strikingly, this 
‘welfare chauvinism’ (Kitschelt, 1995; Mudde, 2000) is mainly found among the lower 
educated (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot, 2006). 
From a classical ‘left’ versus ‘right’ perspective this seems paradoxical, because 
leftism is generally associated with defending the interests of those social categories that find 
themselves in precarious socio-economic positions. Leftist parties for instance generally strive 
for policies aimed at economic redistribution, reduction of socio-economic inequality and a 
more comprehensive welfare state (Budge, 2000). That is why those in precarious socio-
economic positions – lower-skilled workers, those with lower levels of income and the lower 
educated – generally tend to support these parties (Svallfors, 2007; Achterberg and Houtman, 
2009). While these left-wing parties strive for universalist economic redistribution – 
irrespective of ethnicity, that is – their lower-educated native constituencies tend to prefer a 
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more particularist type of redistribution, however, and hence combine economic 
egalitarianism with welfare chauvinism. The aim of this paper is to explain why this is the 
case, i.e., why the lower educated, in contrast to those higher educated who embrace 
economic egalitarianism, do not translate the latter into support for welfare distribution to 
ethnic minorities.  
 
2. Education, economic egalitarianism, and welfare chauvinism 
 
Many studies devoted to the ideological outlook of western publics find a bi-dimensional 
structure of values. One dimension pertains to issues of economic equality, pitting supporters 
of economic redistribution against supporters of laissez-faire economics. The other dimension 
concerns issues of social order and cultural diversity, roughly pitting the authoritarian against 
the libertarian (Converse 1964; Fleishman 1988; Middendorp 1991).  
Among the public at large these two value dimensions are hardly related, but 
educational groups differ on this matter. It is frequently found that the ideological outlook of 
the higher educated is more one-dimensional than that of the lower educated. The former 
hence more often coherently combine a progressive (conservative) stance on issues on one 
dimension with an equally progressive (conservative) stance on issues on the other (see 
Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Carmines and Stimson, 1982; Houtman, Achterberg and 
Derks, 2008). The fact that higher educated advocates of economic redistribution tend to 
support distribution of welfare to ethnic minorities, whereas the ideological profile of the 
lower educated on this matter is less one-dimensional, is hence consistent with previous 
research on ideological structures. An explanation for these differences in dimensionality 
between the higher and the lower educated still needs to be found, however. 
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Three theories might account for the differences between educational categories. The 
first one revolves around differences in political competence between educational categories 
(section 2.1), the second concerns economic threat by immigrants (section 2.2), while the 
third addresses the role of cultural capital. 
  
2.1 Political competence 
The first theory addresses the role of political competence. Several authors have argued that 
ideological coherence or dimensionality depends on ‘cognitive ability’ (Carmines and 
Stimson 1982; Hyman and Wright, 1979; Lipset, 1981; Jenssen and Engesbak, 1994), 
‘cognitive sophistication’ (Bobo and Licari, 1989), ‘political capital’ (Bourdieu, 1984), or 
‘political competence’ (Jackson and Marcus, 1975). Despite these different labels, all of these 
explanations boil down to the idea that the lower educated have less cognitive sophistication 
than the higher educated, which limits the former in comprehending the complexity of 
politics. Political ideas are hence assumed to be consistently integrated into a single and 
logical continuum by well-informed and creative elites (Converse, 1964: 211), because these 
are equipped with a ‘cognitive structure that subsumes content of wide scope and diversity 
[which is] capped by concepts of a high order of abstraction’ (Campbell, Converse, Miller, 
and Stokes, 1960: 193), allowing them ‘to make sense of a broad range of events’ (ibid.). The 
lower educated, on the other hand, are less likely to be equipped to do so, an assumption that 
has been confirmed by Bourdieu’s (1984) finding that the ability to deal with political 
information (the ability to answer questions about politics rather than selecting the ‘don’t 
know’ option) increases with education.  
What our first theory predicts, in short, is that that high levels of political competence 
(i.e., the ability to understand and deal with political information) ensures ideological 
coherence and that this can explain why least ideological coherence tends to be found among 
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the lower educated (Fiske and Kinder, 1981; Judd and Krosnick, 1989; Lerner, Nagai and 
Rothman, 1991; Zaller, 1992). If this is indeed the case, the lower educated translate their 
economic egalitarianism into welfare chauvinism because of their limited political 
competence (hypothesis 1). 
 
2.2 Ethnic competition 
The support for economic egalitarianism among the lower educated can of course be 
explained by the theoretical rationale of class analysis. According to class theory, support for 
redistribution of wealth and income is a direct reflection of class-based economic interests 
(Clark, 1996; Lipset, 1981). Research has demonstrated time and again that it is the weak 
economic position of the lower educated that drives their support for egalitarian measures (De 
Witte, 1997; Houtman, 2001, 2003; Marshall et al., 1988; Svallfors, 1991; Wright, 1985; Van 
der Waal et al., 2007), and makes left-wing parties their ‘natural’ allies because these 
represent their class interests (e.g., Alford, 1967; Clark and Lipset, 1991). However, 
according to the so-called ‘ethnic competition theory’, these class interests tied to an 
economically insecure position are not universal, but conditional on the ethnic group to which 
one belongs.  
 While the theory discussed above assumes that the lower educated lack the cognitive 
sophistication that is required to comprehend the complexity of politics, the ethnic 
competition theory rests upon an opposite assumption: it assumes that lower-educated natives 
have enough insight into the complexity of politics to understand that immigration puts 
pressure onto welfare state programmes and as such poses a threat to their own economic 
security. The ethnic competition theory proposes that it is precisely because of this insight that 
lower-educated natives adopt a negative stance towards ethnic minorities in order to protect 
the economic interests of the native ethnic in-group. The core idea of the ethnic competition 
  5
theory is hence that ‘competition for resources leads to attempts at exclusion of one group by 
another’ (Olzak, 1992: 163). This competition, of course, is most severe for people holding 
economic positions similar to those of ethnic minorities. As most ethnic minorities in western 
societies hold weak to very weak economic positions (Coenders, 2001; Scheepers et al., 
2002), it is primarily the lower-educated natives with whom they compete over scarce 
resources. Consequently, according to the ethnic competition theory, these lower-educated 
natives will adopt a negative stance towards ethnic minorities in order to protect their own, or 
their own group’s position.  
As welfare arrangements are scarce economic resources, especially for the 
economically weak whose economic misfortunes these arrangements intend to abate, the 
ethnic competition theory could explain why lower-educated natives consider ethnic 
minorities less entitled to welfare. This logic has been put forward by Kitschelt (1995) who 
suggested that workers are welfare chauvinists because ‘they fear their material well-being 
may deteriorate if a welfare state backlash occurs [due to immigration]’ (Kitschelt, 1995: 
263). 
Contrary to conventional (Marxist) class analysis, then, the ethnic competition theory 
assumes that class interests are defined in an ethnically particularistic manner and hence as 
shared only with those who belong to the same ethnic group. The ethnic competition theory 
thus predicts that the lower educated translate their economic egalitarianism into welfare 
chauvinism because of their weak economic position (hypothesis 2). 
 
2.3 Cultural capital 
The third theory does not revolve around economic conditions and interests, but around 
differences in cultural capital. It has often been found that the lower educated are less tolerant 
towards cultural differences and hence more intolerant towards out-groups than the higher 
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educated (Emler and Frazer, 1999; Stubager, 2008, 2009). It is important to emphasize that 
this intolerance of the less educated does not stem from their weak economic position, but is 
firmly rooted in their limited amount of cultural capital (Achterberg and Houtman, 2006; 
Houtman, 2003; Van der Waal, 2010), i.e., the ability to recognize cultural expressions and 
comprehend their meaning. Those with ample cultural capital, on the other hand, are much 
more progressive when it comes to issues concerning cultural diversity (Achterberg and 
Houtman 2009; Lamont 1987). While the higher educated tend to appreciate that ‘each 
society, with its norms and values, is one of many, capable of change – in various directions – 
and is the product of man’s effort to come to terms with the world around him and with the 
needs of an ongoing social order’ (Gabennesch 1972: 859), the lower educated are ‘more 
likely to view the social world in fixed, absolute terms’ so as to embrace a ‘“reified” view of 
social reality’ (Idem: 862-3).  
 Cultural capital hence stimulates a ‘denaturalization of culture’ in that it spawns an 
understanding of culture as humanly constructed and as such ultimately contingent and 
radically different from the givens of nature. Research has pointed out that this applies as 
much to ‘embodied’ cultural capital (high-status cultural participation and consumption) as to 
‘institutionalized’ cultural capital (education) in the sense of Bourdieu (1986), while income 
proves not at all to affect authoritarianism and intolerance, underscoring that education indeed 
plays a role here as an indicator for cultural capital rather than economic position (Houtman, 
2003; Houtman, Achterberg and Derks, 2008). 
This ‘liberalizing’ role of cultural capital is a cultural peculiarity of modern liberal 
democracies, as the negative relationship between education on the one hand and ethnic 
intolerance and authoritarianism on the other is substantially weaker or even completely 
absent in less modern, less liberal and less democratic societies (Farnen and Meloen, 2000; 
Simpson, 1972; Weil, 1985). The same goes for art, which in less modern, less liberal and less 
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democratic societies tends to reproduce and legitimate the established order – think of 
medieval art, which was mostly religiously inspired and as such reaffirmed and legitimated 
the by then dominant Christian worldview (Wilson, 1982), or think of Nazi suspicions of 
‘entartete’ modern avant-garde art –, while in the contemporary western world art is rather 
aimed at ‘denaturalization’, i.e., the critical interrogation, deconstruction and disturbance of 
established cultural meanings and practices, aimed at exposing their contingency, social 
constructedness and hence ‘unnaturalness’ (Bell, 1976; Jensen, 1995).  
The ‘liberalizing’ role of cultural capital in liberal democracies assumes that 
particularly those with limited amounts of cultural capital experience cultural diversity as a 
threat, triggering feelings of distrust and cultural insecurity in them. Indeed, research has 
pointed out that those with less education are more culturally insecure (Elchardus and Smits, 
2002, McDill, 1961) and that it is indeed this cultural insecurity that gives rise to their 
authoritarianism and intolerance (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Blank, 2003; Derks, 2006; 
Eisinga and Scheepers, 1989; Elchardus and Smits, 2002; Lutterman and Middleton, 1970; 
McDill, 1961; Roberts and Rokeach, 1956; Srole 1956). 
According to this third theory, then, lower-educated natives are economic egalitarian 
because of their weak economic position, but are also welfare chauvinists because of their 
limited amount of cultural capital and the cultural insecurity this gives rise to, i.e., because 
they understand immigrants as a cultural instead rather than an economic threat. We hence 
hypothesize that the less educated translate their economic egalitarianism into welfare 
chauvinism because of their limited amount of cultural capital and the cultural insecurity this 
entails (hypothesis 3). 
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3. Data and measurement 
 
3.1. Data 
In order to test the hypotheses proposed above, we used data that were collected in the 
Netherlands in 2006. The data have been collected by CentERdata and are representative for 
the Dutch population.[1] A total of 2,682 individuals were contacted to participate in the 
study, of whom 1,972 actually completed the questionnaire – yielding a response rate of 73 
percent. A comparison with official statistics from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) showed that 
the elderly, higher income categories, and the higher educated are somewhat overrepresented. 
We corrected for these overrepresentations by applying a weighting factor. 
 
3.2. Measurement 
For our measurement of economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism we asked respondents 
to what extent they agreed with five Likert-type items with response categories ranging from 
‘totally disagree’ (1) to ‘totally agree’ (5) – the ‘don’t know’ answers were treated as missing: 
1. The state should raise social benefits. 
2. There is no longer any real poverty in the Netherlands.[2] 
3. Large income differences are unfair because everyone is essentially equal. 
4. The state should intervene to reduce income differences. 
5. Companies should be obliged to allow their employees to share in the profits. 
Factor analysis on the responses on these items yielded one factor with an eigenvalue of 2.69, 
explaining about 54% of the variance within these items. After standardizing the items we 
constructed a scale by calculating the mean score for those respondents who validly 
responded to at least four of the five items (Cronbach’s alpha=0.78). Higher scores on the 
scale stand for more economic egalitarianism. 
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Welfare chauvinism / universalism concerns a meta-scale created out of three subscales 
concerning the distribution of welfare support to ethnic minorities. The first subscale, ethnic 
redistribution, is measured with four items concerning support for distributing scarce 
economic resources to ethnic minorities. The response categories of these items range from 
‘totally agree’ (1) to ‘totally disagree’ (5) – the ‘don’t know’ answers are treated as missing. 
1. In the future, non-western immigrants should have fewer entitlements to social 
assistance than Dutch natives. 
2. In the future, western immigrants should have fewer entitlements to social assistance 
than Dutch natives. 
3. In the future, economic refugees should have fewer entitlements to social assistance 
than Dutch natives. 
4. In the future, political refugees should have fewer entitlements to social assistance 
than Dutch natives. 
Factor analysis on these items yielded one factor with an eigenvalue of 3.25, which explains 
about 81% of their variance. After standardizing the items we constructed a scale by 
calculating the mean for each respondent with valid scores on at least three of the four items. 
Higher scores on the scale stand for more support for economic redistribution to ethnic 
minorities (Cronbach’s alpha=0.92). 
The second subscale, ethnic deservingness, is measured with items on the degree to 
which respondents perceive ethnic minorities as deserving social assistance. We asked the 
respondents to indicate, on a scale from 1) ‘absolutely undeserving’ to 10) ‘absolutely 
deserving’, whether they think that the following social categories are entitled to financial 
support by society: 1) Asylum seekers; 2) Illegal aliens; 3) Ethnic minorities. Factor analysis 
on the responses on these three items yielded one factor with an eigenvalue of 2.10, 
explaining about 70% of the variance within these items. After standardizing the items a scale 
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was made by calculating the mean scores for respondents who had valid scores on all three 
items (Cronbach’s alpha=0.78). Higher scores on the scale indicate that respondents perceive 
ethnic minorities as more deserving. 
Ethnic anxiety is the third subscale and measures the fear that immigration harms the 
economic position of natives. For this scale we used the following four items with response 
categories ranging from ‘totally disagree’ (1) to ‘totally agree’ (5) – the ‘don’t know’ answers 
are treated as missing: 
1. Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to live and 
work here. 
2. People who come to live and work here generally harm the economic prospects of the 
poor more than the rich. 
3. If people who come to live and work here are unemployed for a long period, they 
should be made to leave. 
4. People who have come to live here should be given the same rights as everyone 
else.[3] 
Factor analysis on the four items for ethnic anxiety yielded one factor with an eigenvalue of 
2.10, explaining about 53% of their variance. The fourth item is recoded and all items are 
standardized before constructing a scale by calculating the mean for respondents who had 
valid scores on at least three of the four items (Cronbach’s alpha=0.70). Higher scores on the 
scale stand for more fear that immigration harms the economic position of natives. 
To determine whether the items of economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism tap 
into another ideological dimension than the ones of ethnic redistribution, ethnic deservingness 
and ethnic anxiety we executed two factor analyses. The first allowed for just one factor, the 
second one allowed for two factors. The first (one-factor) model in table 1 shows that the 
subscales ethnic redistribution, ethnic deservingness and ethnic anxiety cluster together into a 
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overarching dimension of welfare chauvinism / universalism that only partially overlaps with 
economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism (as indicated by economic egalitarianism’s low 
factor loading of 0.31 in the one-dimensional solution). 
 
Table 1 Secondary factor analysis on scales for economic egalitarianism and welfare 
universalism (Varimax rotation for the two-dimensional model; N=1,629) 
 One-dimensional model Two-dimensional model 
 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Economic egalitarianism  0.31 0.08 0.99 
Ethnic redistribution 0.85 0.86 0.08 
Ethnic deservingness 0.85 0.82 0.22 
Ethnic anxiety  -0.80 -0.84 0.06 
Eigenvalue 2.19 2.12 1.03 
R2 0.55 0.53 0.25 
 
Allowing for two factors in the second model shows that there are indeed two separate 
dimensions, the first explaining support for welfare assistance to ethnic minorities and the 
latter explaining economic egalitarianism. After recoding the subscale ethnic anxiety and 
standardizing ethnic redistribution, ethnic deservingness and ethnic anxiety we constructed a 
meta-scale welfare chauvinism / universalism by calculating the mean score for respondents 
on these three subscales. Higher scores on this scale stand for more support to distribute 
welfare to ethnic minorities.  
Education was measured by using the highest level of education respondents attained. 
For the first part of our analyses, respondents have been recoded into three educational 
categories of roughly comparable size: low (only primary education and VMBO, N=704), 
medium (HAVO/VWO/MBO, N=639) and high (College/Academic, N=771). For our 
multiple linear regression analyses, education was coded as the number of years of schooling 
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needed for the highest level of education a respondent attained, yielding a variable ranging 
from 8 to 18 years. 
To measure political competence we used the thirteen items for economic anti-
egalitarianism / egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism / universalism.[9] Following 
Bourdieu (1984: 426-432; see also Achterberg and Houtman, 2009), we measure political 
competence as the ability to answer items pertaining to political issues. As public opinion 
research has shown, people indicating not to know the answer to a Likert-type item do not 
know how to consistently motivate a conclusion about these issues based on their set of norms 
and predispositions (Nisbet, 2005, Zaller, 1992: 6). Those respondents indicating that they are 
unable to formulate an opinion hence lack the political competence to frame political issues 
into a meaningful opinion saying they (fully) agree, (fully) disagree, or are somewhere in 
between (see also Carmines and Stimson 1982). Therefore we recoded our Likert-type items 
in such a way that respondents who gave a valid response were coded as 1, and those who 
opted for the ‘don’t know’ answer were coded as 0. Factor analysis showed that all items load 
strongly on the first factor with an eigenvalue of 6.49 that explained 50 percent of the 
variance within all items. We constructed a scale for political competence running from zero 
(for those who were unable to answer all thirteen questions) to thirteen for those who 
responded validly to all thirteen questions (Cronbach’s α=0.91). Although it is constructed 
using the items for economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism / 
universalism, the scale for political competence does not correlate with either of these two 
scales (-0.04 and 0.03 respectively, both p>0.05). As one would expect, our measure of 
political competence is positively associated to the level of education: the higher educated are 
better able to formulate valid responses to these items and as such have higher levels of 
political competence than the lower educated (Pearson’s r =0.20, p<0.01). 
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Economic position was measured as in Achterberg and Houtman (2009) using three 
separate indicators. Firstly, respondents were asked whether or not they were unemployed at 
the moment of the interview (‘not unemployed’ (1); ‘underemployed’ (2); ‘totally 
unemployed’ (3)). Secondly, respondents were asked into which of four categories their 
monthly net household income fell: 1) € 2,601 or more; 2) € 1,801 to € 2,600; 3) € 1,151 to € 
1,800; and 4) € 1,150 or less (income). Finally, we measured the current welfare dependency 
of our respondents by asking whether or not they were receiving the following welfare 
benefits: 1) unemployment benefits; 2) incapacity benefits; 3) sickness benefits; 4) social 
assistance. Each item could be answered with yes (1) or no (0). Respondents dependent on 
one or more of these four welfare arrangements were coded as 1, others were coded as 0.  
Drawing on Bourdieu (1986), we use cultural participation as a measure of cultural 
capital, which is common practice (Achterberg, 2006a; 2006b; Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; 
DiMaggio, 1982; DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985; Dumais, 2002; Eitle and Eitle, 2002; Houtman, 
2001; 2003; Houtman, Achterberg and Derks, 2008, Katsillis and Rubinson, 1990; Van der 
Waal, 2010). Cultural participation was measured by asking each respondent the number of 
books he or she owned,[4] the number of novels he or she had read in the previous three 
months, the number of times he or she had been to concerts, the theatre, cabaret or ballet and 
art exhibitions,[5] the frequency with which he or she speaks with others about art and 
culture,[6] and the extent to which he or she regards him- or herself as ‘a lover of arts and 
culture’.[7] Factor analysis produced one factor with an eigenvalue of 2.66, which explains 
about 53 percent of variance within all five items. The reliability of the scale consisting of the 
standardized items is 0.77, and higher scores indicate higher levels of cultural participation. 
Cultural insecurity was measured by means of a slightly altered version of Srole’s (1956) 
widely used scale.[8] We used four items, with response categories ranging from ‘totally 
disagree’ (1) to ‘totally agree’ (5) – the ‘don’t know’ answers are treated as missing: 
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1. These days a person doesn’t really know whom he can count on. 
2. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of 
itself. 
3. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not 
better. 
4. It’s hardly fair to bring children into the world, the way things look for the future. 
Factor analysis of the responses to these four items yielded a first factor with an eigenvalue of 
2.17, explaining 54 percent of the common variance. We have constructed the scale for 
cultural insecurity by standardizing and summing the items with higher scores indicating 
more cultural insecurity (Cronbach’s α=0.71).  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism 
Although economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism / 
universalism both concern issues of economic redistribution, the factor analyses already 
demonstrated that they concern two dimensions that largely operate independent from one 
another. The zero-order correlation of merely 0.17 (p<0.01) between the two dimensions 
points in the same direction. 
Figure 1 shows furthermore that the relationship between support for economic 
egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism differs between educational categories. We found the 
strongest correlation between economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism and welfare 
chauvinism / universalism for the higher educated and the weakest for the lower educated. 
This means that the higher educated strongly combine economic egalitarianism with support 
for welfare assistance to ethnic minorities (and economic anti-egalitarianism with low support 
for welfare assistance to ethnic minorities). As expected, this relationship decreases steadily 
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with a declining educational level. For the lowest educational category, we still find a 
statistically significant and positive effect, but compared to the findings for the higher 
educated this relationship is rather weak. For the lower educated, being economic egalitarian 
implies support for welfare assistance to ethnic minorities to a much lesser extent than for the 
higher educated. Thus, the ideological profile of the lower educated is less one-dimensional, 
just like we expected. 
 
Figure 1 Associations between economic egalitarianism and welfare universalism for three 
educational categories 
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In table 2 we test whether the findings that are depicted in figure 1 are statistically 
significant. The positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction term of education 
and economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism shows they are: the association between 
economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism / universalism clearly 
increases as people have a higher level of education. The question is how this pattern can be 
explained. 
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Table 2 Explaining welfare universalism: the conditionality of the association between 
economic egalitarianism and welfare universalism on educational level (Linear 
regression, Method=Enter; entries are beta’s) 
 Model 1 
Education 0.25** 
Economic egalitarianism 0.05 ns 
Education * Economic egalitarianism 0.17** 
Rsq (adjusted) 0.09 
N 1,628 
**p<0.01 (two-tailed test for significance) 
 
4.2. Why is the association between egalitarianism and welfare universalism conditional 
on level of education? 
Before investigating how it can be explained that the combination of economic egalitarianism 
and welfare chauvinism differs between educational categories, we first show the driving 
forces of both dimensions in table 3. It shows that political competence underlies neither 
economic egalitarianism nor support for welfare assistance to ethnic minorities. Moreover, it 
demonstrates that an economically insecure position leads to economic egalitarianism, 
whereas it does not influence welfare universalism. The lower educated, the unemployed, 
those with low incomes and those who are dependent on welfare are the greatest supporters of 
economic redistribution by the state, but they do not differ from those in stronger economic 
positions regarding support for distribution of welfare to ethnic minorities. The indicators for 
cultural position – cultural participation and cultural insecurity – show an opposite pattern: 
their influence on welfare universalism is much stronger than their effect on economic 
egalitarianism. Together, these findings demonstrate that welfare chauvinism / universalism 
has cultural roots – welfare universalism can be found among people with lower levels of 
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cultural insecurity and higher levels of cultural participation, while a weak economic position 
does not have any effect on welfare universalism whatsoever.[10]  
 
Table 3 Drivers of economic egalitarianism and welfare universalism (Linear regression, 
method= enter; entries are beta’s)  
 Economic egalitarianism Welfare universalism 
Political competence -0.03 ns 0.01 ns 
Education -0.15** 0.05 ns 
Unemployed 0.07** 0.03 ns 
Low income 0.13** 0.03 ns 
Welfare dependency 0.12** 0.04 ns 
Cultural participation -0.05* 0.26** 
Cultural insecurity 0.09** -0.31** 
Rsq (adjusted) 0.10 0.22 
N 1,818 1,644 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
These preliminary results already cast doubts on the empirical validity of the political 
competence theory and ethnic competition theory for explaining differences in combinations 
of economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism between educational categories. Instead, 
they point in the direction of the cultural logic that focuses on the low levels of cultural capital 
and high levels of cultural insecurity of the lower educated as compared to the higher 
educated. The decisive test is given in table 4.  
Model 1 replicates the results of table 2 by showing that the higher educated more 
often combine their economic egalitarian values with support for distributing welfare to ethnic 
minorities than the lower educated. The subsequent models 2, 3, and 4, test the hypotheses 
derived from the political competence theory, ethnic competition theory and the theory 
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concerning the cultural logic respectively. If the interaction-effect of education and economic 
anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism is reduced, we find the reason why lower-educated 
natives more often combine economic egalitarianism with welfare chauvinism than the higher 
educated. 
 
Table 4 The conditionality of the association between economic egalitarianism and welfare 
universalism on educational level explained (Dependent variable welfare 
universalism; Linear regression, method=enter; entries are beta’s)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Education 0.25** 0.25** 0.23** 0.15** 
Economic egalitarianism 0.05 ns 0.05 ns 0.06 ns 0.20** 
Education * Economic egalitarianism 0.17** 0.16** 0.17** 0.08* 
Political competence -- -0.01 ns -0.01 ns 0.01 ns 
Unemployed -- -- 0.02 ns 0.02 ns 
Low income -- -- -0.07** -0.06* 
Welfare dependency -- -- -0.01 ns 0.02 ns 
Cultural participation -- -- -- 0.24** 
Cultural insecurity -- -- -- -0.33** 
Rsq (adjusted) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.26 
N 1,628    
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
Political competence was entered in model 2 to tests the explanation that addresses the 
importance of this competence. As can be seen from the model, it does not yield a significant 
effect. Therefore, it cannot explain why the association between economic egalitarianism and 
welfare universalism is higher among the higher educated than among the lower educated. 
Although the zero-order correlation between educational level and political competence is 
positive and statistically significant (Pearson’s r =0.20, p<0.01), the higher political 
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competence of the higher educated clearly does not drive the pattern observed. The 
interaction-effect found in model 1 remains intact, which leads us to reject our first 
hypothesis. 
 The three indicators for weak economic position were entered into the third model to 
test the explanatory mechanism centered on competition concerning scarce resources between 
ethnic groups. It appears that neither the unemployed nor those dependent on welfare (two 
largely overlapping economically insecure social categories) differ from the employed and 
those not dependent on welfare respectively when it comes to support for welfare assistance 
to ethnic competitors. Only one indicator for a weak economic position, low income, has a 
significant effect, which means that people with lower levels of income are less supportive of 
welfare assistance to ethnic minorities. Although this is in accordance with the ethnic 
competition theory, it cannot explain why the lower educated combine economic 
egalitarianism with welfare universalism to a lesser extent than the higher educated: the 
interaction-effect found in model 1 does not decline in strength. Hence, the results in this 
model lead us to reject the second hypothesis.  
 Finally, the last model tests the explanation based on the aversion to cultural 
differences due to low levels of cultural capital and high levels of cultural insecurity. As can 
be seen from model 4 we find that a higher score on cultural insecurity is negatively 
associated to welfare universalism and a high score on cultural participation is positively 
associated with welfare universalism. Both effects were expected according to the cultural 
logic addressed in section 2.3, and suggest that cultural differences drive the resistance to 
support welfare assistance to ethnic minorities. And indeed, the magnitude of the interaction 
effect between education and economic egalitarianism reduces strongly, from 0.17 to 0.08, 
after entering cultural participation and cultural insecurity. It is the cultural insecurity 
(Pearson’s r between education and cultural insecurity is -0.24; p<0.01) and low level of 
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cultural participation (Pearson’s r between cultural participation and educational level is 0.22; 
p<0.01), of the lower educated that underlies their welfare chauvinism. Contrary to their 
support for economic egalitarianism, which is informed by economic interests such as a lower 
income and welfare dependency, the welfare chauvinism of the lower educated is rooted in 
their cultural position. The analyses performed above hence indicate that the lower educated 
are simultaneously inclined to support economic egalitarianism for economic reasons and 
inclined to reject welfare universalism for cultural reasons. The strong reduction in the 
magnitude of the interaction-term thus means that our third hypothesis can be confirmed: the 
lower educated translate their economic egalitarianism into welfare chauvinism because of 
their limited amount of cultural capital and the cultural insecurity this entails. 
After modeling cultural capital and cultural insecurity there proves to be an association 
between economic anti-egalitarianism / egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism / 
universalism. In model 1 through 3 this association was suppressed, which can be explained 
according to the cultural logic as well. After entering cultural participation and cultural 
insecurity the cultural conservatism that underlies particularistic economic egalitarianism, 
especially among lower-educated natives, is filtered out. It is this cultural conservatism of the 
‘natural’ social basis of left-wing parties that causes their opinions on cultural matters to 
diverge from left-wing elites. Once controlled for this cultural conservatism, the economic 
egalitarianism of the lower educated becomes more universal, and consequently includes 
support for distributing welfare to ethnic minorities. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Several studies on deservingness in European countries found that although lower-educated 
natives strongly support economic egalitarianism they consider ethnic minorities least entitled 
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for welfare arrangements. From a classical leftist politics point of view this seems rather odd, 
as ethnic minorities belong to the weakest economic categories in these countries, and lower-
educated natives support leftist parties for their politics of economic redistribution. Although 
leftist parties strive for universal redistribution from the rich to the poor, i.e. irrespective of 
the ethnicity of the latter, their native social basis apparently has a more particularistic 
conception of economic redistribution: primarily the economically weak of the same ethnicity 
are considered entitled to welfare. 
 This ideological profile of a ‘progressive’ stance concerning economic redistribution 
and a ‘conservative’ stance on the distribution of welfare to ethnic minorities calls for an 
explanation, and the central aim of this article was to find it. Therefore, we assessed three 
competing theories that could account for the observation that the lower educated are more 
likely to combine economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism. The first one concerned 
the idea that the lower educated are less politically competent, the second one revolves around 
competition for scarce economic resources between ethnic groups, and the third one 
emphasized cultural capital. 
 Although the lower educated are less politically competent than the higher educated, 
this could not account for their combination of economic egalitarianism and low support for 
the distribution of welfare to ethnic minorities. The ethnic competition theory could not 
explain this combination either. Despite that the lower-educated Dutch experience 
competition from immigrants due to their weak economic position (Van der Waal, 2009a, Van 
der Waal, 2009b), this proved not to be responsible for their reluctance to distribute welfare to 
ethnic minorities. What is responsible, is lower-educated natives’ limited amount of cultural 
capital and high level of cultural insecurity. This accounts for the fact that they more often 
support welfare chauvinism irrespective of their economic egalitarianism. 
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This finding shows that only on the basis of their weak economic position the lower 
educated are the ‘natural’ social basis of leftist parties. This weak economic position is what 
drives their economic egalitarianism and subsequent support of leftist policies aimed at 
distribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. A low level of education does not only 
indicate a weak economic position however, but also a low level of cultural capital and is 
strongly associated with high levels of cultural insecurity. The latter two both yield an 
aversion to cultural differences which drives the opinion of the lower-educated natives that 
some are more equal than others. As ethnic minorities are culturally different, lower-educated 
natives consider them as less entitled to welfare than the economically weak of their own 
ethnicity. Higher-educated natives, on the other hand, hold less ethnocentric views when it 
comes to the distribution of welfare. If they are economic egalitarian, it is economic 
egalitarianism of a more universal kind due to their large amount of cultural capital and high 
level of cultural security. 
These finding are at odds with the argument of Kitschelt (1995: 262) that ‘the 
derivative of the comprehensive welfare state is thus a “welfare chauvinism” that is not 
necessarily rooted in cultural patterns of xenophobia and racism, but in a “rational” 
consideration of alternative options to preserve social club goods in efficient ways’. If so, the 
welfare chauvinism of lower-educated natives would be driven by their weak economic 
position and not by their limited amount of cultural capital and the cultural insecurity this 
entails. However, our study clearly shows the opposite: a weak economic position has no 
impact on welfare chauvinism whatsoever, while a weak cultural position does, and quite 
strongly so. 
The findings in this article have implications for two adjacent fields of research, the 
first one being the debate on the impact of immigration on support for the welfare state. Mau 
and Burckhardt (2009) recently found that the impact of immigration on the overall opinion 
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towards granting rights to immigrants in Western Europe is rather small. Consequently, they 
conclude that ‘the fear that the welfare state might lose its support when the share of migrants 
increases seems to be exaggerated’ (Mau and Burckhardt, 2009: 225). The findings in this 
study suggest that this conclusion is premature as the impact of immigration on the overall 
opinion might be small, but that this is the case because it mainly affects the lower educated. 
For the question as to whether immigration undermines support for the welfare state this is a 
highly salient finding, as the lower educated form the ‘natural’ basis of left-wing parties and 
associated welfare state arrangements. In short, immigration might have a small effect on 
opinions concerning the welfare state in general, but affects the opinions of the ‘natural’ 
supporters of that welfare state the most. The eventual consequences of immigration on 
support for the welfare state might therefore be stronger than Mau and Burckhardt (2009) 
suspect. 
This brings us to the second debate that can be informed by our findings. Several 
studies have shown that cultural issues have risen in salience in the political domain of 
western countries in recent decades (Inglehart, 1997; Hechter, 2004; Achterberg, 2006b, De 
Koster et al., 2008; Van der Waal and Achterberg, 2006b). Consequently, besides the 
electoral cleavage between the working class (left-wing parties) and the middle class (right-
wing parties) driven by their class interests, a new cleavage arose that revolves around 
questions of social order and cultural identities (Achterberg, 2006b; Hechter 2004). This new 
cleavage does not so much pit the economically weak against the economically strong (the so-
called democratic class struggle), but the culturally conservatives or authoritarians versus the 
culturally progressives or libertarians as united in new-rightist and new-leftist parties 
respectively. The existence of an economic and cultural cleavage in the political domain in 
western countries yields a cross pressure in the electorate (Achterberg and Houtman, 2006; 
Houtman, 2003). On the basis of their class interests the lower educated are inclined to vote 
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for left-wing parties, while on the basis of their cultural conservatism or authoritarianism they 
are inclined to vote for new-rightist parties (Van der Waal et al., 2007; Houtman et al., 2008). 
This cross-pressure has seriously undermined the social bases of classical social democratic 
parties in Western Europe (Achterberg, 2006b; Van der Waal et al., 2007).  
The findings in this article indicate that it is not only the rising salience of cultural 
issues in these countries that is responsible for this, but also the fact that the welfare state in 
its current form is discredited (e.g., Houtman, Achterberg and Derks, 2008). This is not very 
likely to change due to its intrinsic universal nature – no ethnic groups are excluded from 
welfare arrangements. Consequently, one of the classical instruments of left-wing parties to 
persuade lower-educated natives to vote for them – welfare arrangements to abate their 
economic misfortunes – can also lead to an even stronger alienation than already has occurred 
in recent decades due to the rising salience of cultural issues in the political domain. The 
universal nature of the welfare state combined with immigration is just as likely to commit 
lower-educated natives to new-rightist parties because of their cultural conservatism or 
authoritarianism. 
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Notes 
 
[1] For more information see: http://www.centerdata.nl/en/index.html. 
[2] The responses to this item have been recoded to match the direction of the other items: higher scores stand 
for more economic egalitarianism. 
[3] The responses to this item have been recoded to match the direction of the other items: higher scores stand 
for more ethnic anxiety. 
[4] Answer categories ranged from 1: ‘less than 50’ to 6: ‘1,000 or more’. 
[5] Answer categories ranged from 1: ‘(almost) never’ to 4: ‘more than six times a year’. 
[6] Answer categories ranged from 1: ‘(almost) never’ to 4: ‘(almost) every day’. 
[7] Answer categories ranged from 1: ‘definitely not’ to 3: ‘Yes, definitely’. 
[8] We have replaced an item in the original scale about the usefulness of writing public officials by the first 
item listed because the former seemed to tap mainly into political cynicism. 
[9] Since the items for ethnic deservingness did not contain don’t know answers we could not use them in this 
measure. 
[10] If cultural insecurity is removed from the analysis explaining welfare universalism, education has a small 
but significant effect and the impact of cultural participation increases. The fact that cultural insecurity 
suppressed the education effect indicates this effect should be interpreted as a cultural one.  
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